



"Basically, an attacker can grab 64K of memory from a server. The attack leaves no trace, and can be done multiple times to grab a different random 64K of memory. This means that anything in memory
-- SSL private keys, user keys, anything -- is vulnerable. And you have to assume that it is all compromised. All of it.

#### "Catastrophic" is the right word. On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11."

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/heartbleed.html



## Heartbleed





### What was the bug? - Buffer over-read

- Attacker controlled buffer size





### What made it bad?

- Remote attack
- High value memory
- Wide deploy





"The (1) TLS and (2) DTLS implementations in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1g **do not properly handle Heartbeat Extension packets**,

which allows remote attackers to **obtain sensitive information from process memory** via crafted packets that trigger a buffer over-read"





# Heartbleed is a prime example of an **Information Leak**





### Heartbleed is famous for how devastating it was But it also became the poster child for fuzzing



## Introduction to Memory Exploitation

### **CPPEUROPE** 2021 PATRICIA AAS







### Patricia Aas - Trainer & Consultant

**C++ Programmer, Application Security** Currently : **TurfleSec** 

Previously : Vivaldi, Cisco Systems, Knowit, Opera Software Master in Computer Science

Pronouns: she/they





## Fuzzing





### Now that's is all nice and good But most memory errors don't cause us to crash At least not right away



## Sanitizers

14

#### Address Sanitizer



VS

CCE

Clang

### compiler instrumentation run-time library





15



### Address Sanitizer provokes crash-like behavior for many memory bugs **Supercharges fuzzing** Makes it possible to find "hidden" bugs







### So you found a bug. What now?

18

Exploitation

19









Piece of code, typically in machine code, that is delivered and executed as a part of an exploit. Called "shellcode" because a **traditional use was to start a shell**, for example sh. In real exploits it will **deliver some kind of mechanism for further (remote) compromise** of the system.







To run your shellcode you need the instruction pointer to jump to your shellcode.

The instruction pointer jumps in many different scenarios

- goal here is to control where it jumps to, examples:

return from a function virtual function call function pointer







A vulnerability or a capability in the application that can be used as a part of a wider exploit is often referred to as a "*primitive*" - examples: **Arbitrary Read Primitive** Write-What-Where Primitive **Read-Where Primitive** 



## Mitigations

26

### Platform and Compiler Mitigations



TurfleSec



Nº9 DOCK





#### **Dead Store Elimination**

The compiler is allowed to optimize away stores that cannot be detected Meaning memset'ing of memory that is never read can be removed

### THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING MEMSET

## The Heap

### Allocators



### Simple Pool Allocator





### Empty Pool













#### An allocation is freed - what now?





#### An allocation is freed - what now?





#### Another allocation is freed - what now?





#### Another allocation is freed - what now?





#### Another allocation is freed - what now?









### So... how can we exploit this behavior? We can allocate!









### Fill memory with a certain byte sequence possibly shellcode so that a "random" jump might hit it



#### Heap Spraying





#### Initial state



#### Heap Spraying





Fill memory with shellcode







### This is a bit scattershot Can we have more control?



## (Heap Feng Shui)



### Create predictable memory patterns Trick the allocator to allocate a specific chunk A chunk you can control Let's see it in action



## Putting it all together

52



#### "The Shadow Brokers"

Hacking group behind a leak in 2016-17 The leaked exploits and tools are believed to be NSAs The Shadow Brokers are suspected to be Russian The leak was done in several batches Most famous is the **Eternal Blue** exploit







Aside: This is the diagram of all things computer

## Eternal Exploits Ftern

### EternalBlue

TEDDY









### Write-What-Where Primitive and Remote Code Execution



### Linear Buffer Overrun, Heap Spray / Heap Grooming







"When updating the length of the list, the size is written to as if it were a 16-bit ushort, when it is actually a 32-bit ulong. This means that the upper 16-bits are not updated when the list gets truncated." Microsoft Defender Security Research Team



### Heap Grooming and Spray



- Primes the heap
- Fills with blocks ready for shellcode
- Makes room for buffer that will overrun
- Overrun will prepare code execution
- Hopes to overrun into one of the prepared blocks





Γ									

#### Initial state









### Filling gaps to make allocations predictable







### Prefill before making pattern





























### Code Execution

### When connection is closed the shellcode is executed in the block(s) that have been overrun Installs the DoublePulsar backdoor implant





### How does that affect me?

68



### There is no magic here These are bugs you can find The tools *they* use are tools *you* can use **Basically:** Fix Bugs



